In the relevant context of quantum machine learning, here we address the question, "Can a learner complete the learning securely assisted by a quantum property?" We present a classical-quantum hybrid protocol, which is robust against any malicious attacks on a training dataset. It allows only legitimate learners to perform learning, excluding other intruders. We establish a link between secure learning and its sample-complexity bound in the model of probably-approximately-correct (PAC) learning. Specifically, we show that not only can the lower bound on the learning samples characterize a PAC learner, but also an upper bound can be derived to rule out adversarial learners in our protocol. The security condition here stems from the fundamental quantum no-broadcasting principle; thus, no such condition occurs in the classical regime. Therefore, our protocol realizes an instance of genuinely quantum secure learning. The hybrid architecture of our scheme can offer a practical advantage for implementation in noisy intermediate-scale quantum devices.
Introduction.-The hybridization of machine learning and quantum theory has intensively been studied, particularly to explore the possibility of taking advantage of quantum learning speed-ups. Recently, encouraging results were obtained by incorporating useful quantum algorithm kernels (e.g., quantum linear solvers [1] ) into the tasks of data processing in machine learning [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Within a few years, such an approach has become increasingly important in quantum computation, leading to the establishment of quantum machine learning (QML) as a full-fledged research field [7, 8] .
In parallel, security issues have also been investigated in the machine learning community. Here, by "secure learning" we mean that the learning is allowed only for the legitimate learner, who wants to rule out any other adversarial learners. The main goal of these adversaries is to become learners of equal ability or to drive the original legitimate learner to counterproductive learning by taking out crucial information from a training dataset. Thus, secure learning has most often been formulated on datasets that are possibly altered in the sampling process. This problem has been widely studied in the classical learning theory [9, 10] . However, only a few quantummechanical studies have been conducted so far [6, 11, 12] .
In this paper, we explore the secure learning condition, assisted with favorable quantum properties, and from this we introduce a notion of quantum secure learning. Thus, we first design a protocol for secure sampling that runs between two legitimate learning parties. Here, we cast a classical-quantum hybrid sampling oracle [13] [14] [15] . As the main result, we derive the theoretical condi-tion such that the original legitimate learner becomes solely a secure learner, designated here as "quantum secure probably-approximately-correct (PAC) learner." The security condition stems from the principle of nobroadcasting of quantum states [16, 17] , and is thus fundamentally distinct from classical scenarios. Our study leads to classical-quantum hybrid strategies for secure learning, which can be realizable with noisy intermediatescale quantum (NISQ) technologies [18] .
Problem.-Given a (Boolean) function c that maps the input x = x 0 x 1 · · · x n−1 to a binary value c(x) ∈ {0, 1}, learning is defined as the process of identifying a hypothesis h ∈ H close to c. The binary number x j ∈ {0, 1} (j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1) can be considered as the "feature." Here, the size of the hypothesis set |H| is assumed to be finite. Such a definition of learning has been frequently studied in computational learning theory [19, 20] .
In the learning, the learner, say Alice (A ), first samples a set T of input-output pairs: T = {(x, c(x))}. To accomplish this, A is given to access a block-box operation, called oracle. The oracle is responsible for accessing critical learning information, i.e., c(x) for a given x.
Here, we assume that the oracle is owned by A 's distant partner, say Bob (B). Such an assumption, namely of the two learning parties being located far apart, is commonly invoked in secure learning. The issue is then how A can sample a clean dataset T with B against any malicious attack; hence, how A can learn c securely.
Secure sampling protocol.-First, we introduce a classical-quantum hybrid oracle, denoted as O(c), which allows the input/output (I/O) channels for n-bit clas- 
FIG. 1:
Schematic illustration of our sampling protocol. Alice (A ) has facilities for the preparation of inputs, (x, |α ∈ {|0 , |1 }) or (r, |α ∈ {|+ , |− }). A can also perform a single-qubit measurement to identify the returning qubit. Bob (B) possesses the oracle. Here, we consider the classicalquantum hybrid architecture (blue dashed and solid boxes) with the classical input (x or r) and ancillary qubit state (|α ) [15] . Note that oracle does not open its structure. A and B communicate via classical and quantum channels, denoted as C A B and Q A B , respectively.
sical data x and for a single qubit (denoted as C A B and Q A B , respectively). The oracle comprises 2 n gates in Q A B : one single-qubit gateâ 0 and 2 n − 1 gatesâ k (k = 1, . . . , 2 n − 1) conditioned on C A B , as depicted in Fig. 1 . The gatesâ k are either to beσ z or iσ y , and the target map c is specified by a predetermined sequence of the gates. This oracle O(c) implements (x, |α ) → (x, |c(x) ), where |α (α ∈ {0, 1}) and |c(x) are the input and output of Q A B , respectively. The gateŝ a k are inaccessible because the oracle O(c) is a black-box.
We then present the secure sampling protocol, which proceeds as follows. First, A prepares the state |α , either to be an eigenstate ofσ z orσ
The output states |c(x) or |c(r) of the qubit are then delivered back to A . For |α ∈ {|0 , |1 }, A obtains a pair of data (x, c(x)) by performingσ z -measurement. Otherwise, for |α ∈ {|+ , |− }, A has to receive |c(r) = |α from B because the states |± are flipped to |∓ by each single-gateâ k ∈ {σ z , iσ y } so that |± remains unchanged by applying an even number (2 n ) of gates. Thus, by checking the returned state |c(r) withσ x -measurement, 
FIG. 2:
Collective attack by adversarial learners. Here, we consider L − 1 adversarial learners who can freely access C A B and Q A B . Each adversarial learner has its own (in principle, infinite-size) ancillary system and is assumed to be very familiar with quantum theory. We further assume that the adversarial learners can team up to process an optimal strategy E for their own or for the group's benefit.
A can sense any adversarial learner, often referred to as Eve (E ), who alters the qubits moving A → B or B → A (see Fig. 1 ).
No-broadcasting of training samples.-With this protocol, here, we present our first result: where F (ρ,σ) denotes the fidelity between the statesρ andσ [21] , andρ (k) E is the state yielded from a strategy E, which is to be distributed to any k-th learner.
For the proof of this theorem, we first letρ 1 (r) = |c(r) c(r)| for any random input r; thus,ρ 1 (r) ∈ {|+ +| , |− −|}. Let us suppose that B adopts a strategy E to distribute the samples in T among the learners. In general, E can be represented as a completely positive and trace-preserving (CPTP) map such thatρ s ⊗Γ
E,s (s = 0, 1), wherê Γ represents a state of L − 1 qubits, each of which is distributed to the corresponding learner, except A (Here, k = 1 stands for A ). Subsequently, we can writê
where Tr S\(k) stands for the partial trace with respect to all systems S except the one labeled with k-th learner,Ξ is an arbitrary ancilla state, andÛ E is an overall unitary. This situation is depicted in Fig. 2 . Then, noting the indistinguishability of the statesρ E,s =ρ s for all k. In other words, B cannot broadcastρ s (s = 0, 1) to the (k-indexed) learners [16] ; and hence, the proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
Here, we set r = x, so that the crucial property for proving no-broadcasting, i.e.,ρ
(k) E,0 , can be used for a given x. Note that such a setting is for convenience of representation [26] and does not limit the generality of the arguments at all.
Secure PAC learning.-Suppose that A is the only legitimate learner, and other L − 1 ones are malicious intruders. Without loss of generality, we let k ∈ {A , E } with L = 2, or equivalently by assuming that all L − 1 intruders team up together as one E . In this setting, we can assume that E is an attack strategy (which corresponds to a collective attack) adopted by E . Then, Theorem 1 is extended as follows: no strategy E exists for any E to achieve A 's samples satisfying Eq. (1). It directly leads to the following condition
which characterizes the attainable fidelities (ensemble) averaged over T with non-negative values η (k) ≤ 1 2 . Note that η (k) is determined by E 's strategy E. Here, it should also be indicated that there is a tradeoff relation between η A and η E (or F (ρ 0 ,ρ A E ) and F (ρ 0 ,ρ E E )), which originates from the quantum principle of information-gain versus disturbance [22, 23] . Note further that both η A and η E cannot simultaneously be smaller than a value of η c , where
which is given from E 's optimal strategy E opt for broadcastingρ s (s = 0, 1). Here, E opt is obtained by min E F (ρ 0 (x),ρ A E,0 (x)) and max E F (ρ 1 (r),ρ A E,1 (r)), and η c is known as 1 6 in the qubit case [17] . Thus, the nobroadcasting theorem forbids the following condition:
We then proceed to study secure learning in the framework of so-called "probably-approximately-correct (PAC)" learning [20, 24] . Following a model of PAC learning, we call A a ( , δ)-PAC learner if anapproximated correct solution (i.e., hypothesis) h is found with a probability 1 − δ; c) is an arbitrary error function that indicates how h and c are different [20] . Note that if A is allowed to use M samples satisfying
then A can become a ( , δ)-PAC learner. We call M b ( , δ) the sample-complexity bound, which has the meaning of the minimum sample size for A being a ( , δ)-PAC learner. However, if E disturbs the protocol with a strategy E, the samples prepared by A (and also E ) must be noisy; specifically, the η A (and η E ) portion of invalid pairs, e.g., (x, c(x) ⊕ 1), would be involved in A 's (and E 's) samples [refer to Eq. (2)]. Here, A (and also E ) cannot discriminate these invalid pairs. In this case, the sample-complexity bound in Eq. (5) is modified as [19, 25] :
where M A b ( , δ) and M E b ( , δ) denote A 's and B s sample-complexity bound, respectively.
We are now ready to give our second result: The proof of this theorem is as follows. First, let us consider the case (i) η A ≥ η E , and thus,
In this case, it is impossible for A to be a ( , δ)-PAC learner with the samples less than M E b ( , δ). Second, (ii) in the case η A < η E , if A completes the learning with M samples and becomes a ( , δ)-PAC learner
, then E cannot simultaneously be a ( , δ)-PAC learner because the number of E 's samples cannot be larger than M . Therefore, Theorem 2 is proved.
Based on the above analysis, we introduce a definition for characterizing a secure learner:
where
Then, we call A a quantum secure ( , δ)-PAC learner.
In this definition, the lower-bound of the sample size (i.e., M ≥ M b ( , δ)) is necessary for A to be a ( , δ)-PAC learner and the upper-bound (i.e., M c ( , δ) ≥ M ) is adopted for security-which prevents E from becoming a PAC learner for the same and δ. This follows from Theorem 2. Note here that the underlying physics that engages for the security is the no-broadcasting theorem.
For consistent use of Theorem 1, 2 and Definition 1, we apply two additional rules in our secure learning pro- confirming that the state-change, i.e., |± → |∓ , occurs because of E 's disturbances; but otherwise, A continues the process. Here, we approximate
denotes the number of contaminated pairs in A 's sample after a certain number of trials [27] . [R.2] If the learning is not completed until M c ( , δ) trials with (x, |α ∈ {|0 , |1 }), A quits the process. With this rule, we can block the possibility of E becoming a PAC learner. Now, we can analyze every possible situation. First, consider the case (i) η A ≥ η E , then two sub-cases are given as follows:
Here, in the cases (i-a) and (i-b), [R.1] will halt A 's learning because of the condition η A ≥ η c , and E is not allowed to prepare a sufficiently large number of samples and hence to become a ( , δ)-PAC learner. Second, for the case (ii) η A < η E , we can also consider the sub-cases:
In the case (ii-a), if A can learn h c (for any given and δ) with M samples satisfying Eq. (7), A becomes the secure ( , δ)-PAC learner in accordance with Definition 1, while E cannot. However, if A cannot complete learning with the samples larger than M E b ( , δ), the protocol is halted by [R.2]; thus, noting η E > η c in (ii-a), E does not have a large enough (i.e., larger than M E b ( , δ)) sample size to be a ( , δ)-PAC learner. The condition η A ≥ η c in (ii-b) will also halt the protocol by [R.1]. Thus, our results (i.e., Theorem 1 and 2 and Definition 1) can be applied to the protocol, consistently and more practically. Note that the sub-cases η c ≥ η A ≥ η E and η c ≥ η E > η A are not expected to occur because they conflict with the no-broadcasting theorem [refer to Eq. (4)].
Remarks.-We have studied a concept of secure learning against any malicious spoilage of training samples. In contrast to other studies, we constructed an analytic framework based on the computational model of learning theory, called PAC learning. This allows us to establish the link between sample complexity and security of learning. Our approach is appealing because the security of learning is proven solely by the size of samples, namely, independently of A 's (or E 's) learning algorithm.
Our derivations of Theorem 1 and 2 arise from the principle of no-broadcasting of quantum states, and from these theorems we introduced the concept of secure learning. Such a security condition is believed not to occur in the classical learning regime, where E can create as many copies of the samples as he/she wishes.
We designed a protocol for secure sampling by using the classical-quantum hybrid oracle, where the input data could remain classical, but only a single-qubit system was employed-which considerably differs from other hybrid models. We thus expect that the presented protocol can be applied to practical tasks of secure learning suitable for current technology. Note further that we could also achieve another advantage of quantum learning (specifically, a reduction in the sample complexity) using such a hybrid architecture [15] . Therefore, our work is expected to expand the frontiers for quantum secure learning, providing a route for NISQ implementations [18] .
